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310 Takeaways 
1)   It is highly uncertain how the economic crisis that is 
already hitting the global economy will continue to 
develop. This matters both in terms of developing a 
strategy, including an exit strategy from the current 
period of lockdown; and for policymaking, resulting 
in greater uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
potential crisis responses.  
2)   This crisis will likely be very different from previous 
economic downturns. There will be at least two 
phases: a period of lockdown, followed by a rebound; 
and the subsequent, longer-term recession or even 
depression. Policies must be targeted to deal with 
these distinct phases. 
3)   During the lockdown, it is necessary to provide 
bridging support to companies and individuals, to 
enable economic survival until restrictions can be 
gradually lifted. This will limit the accumulation of 
liabilities that hinder a reactivation of activities. For 
the subsequent recession, a continuous stimulus will 
be needed to foster and sustain recovery.
4)   The possibility of a second wave of the pandemic in 
any territory cannot be excluded. Its likelihood will 
be increased if restrictions are loosened prematurely, 
amplifying the negative impact. A precautionary 
approach thus minimises the potential impact on not 
only health but also the economy.
5)   There will not be a return to the pre-crisis economic 
environment. There will be structural shifts and 
permanent changes to levels of demand for particular 
goods and services. Policies will need to be adjusted 
to ensure that jobs and economic activity which 
will not restart post-crisis are not maintained 
indefinitely. Governments will need to manage 
permanent reductions in demand. 
6)   The economic impact of the crisis will vary, depending 
on different trajectories of the crisis as well as specific 
vulnerabilities and capacities of governments. Those 
regions and/or countries able to reopen early on are 
likely to have an advantage, regaining and, at times, 
overtaking others in the market.
7)   Government action, including coordination across 
borders and of learning and feedback, will matter. 
Governments will also be much more involved in 
many parts of the economy. However, the capacities 
of governments will also be more limited, given 
increased levels of debt and the need to support 
many parts of the economy in the long term. The 
capacity to act also differs between governments.
8)   Global and European interdependence will persist 
in the post-crisis environment. But European 
and international supply chains will potentially 
be disrupted and, at times, permanently altered 
in the aftermath of the pandemic. To be able to 
maintain Europe’s current living standards in a more 
restrictive global environment, reliance on each 
other, including the Single Market, will be crucial.
9)   The world’s approach to economic development will 
alter. In some countries, the crisis will generate an 
impetus towards a more sustainable and socially just 
society. However, many governments will be tempted 
to focus on jobs and growth solely, regardless 
of distributional or environmental impacts. The 
delineation between the public and private sectors 
will also become increasingly blurry and approaches 
to macroeconomic management, monetary policy 
and the financial sector are likely to change in the 
post-pandemic phase.
10)   The only effective instrument that has been created 
to deal with cross-border challenges like this 
pandemic and its aftermath is the European Union. 
However, it crucially depends on whether Europe 
will deliver collectively. This will require fast and 
decisive action, including unconditional and effective 
solidarity. Old divisions should not be allowed to 
stand in the way of an effective crisis response.
The key lesson is that at a time when many instincts 
point to a greater focus on the national level and greater 
sovereignty and self-reliance, the best answer lies  
in greater cooperation, at the very least at the  
European level.
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For the time being, the health impact of the  
COVID-19 pandemic will, for obvious reasons related to 
the devastating effects of the virus, continue to be at the 
forefront of public policy. However, the concerns over 
its economic impact are already omnipresent, too. One 
of the great uncertainties of this crisis is the nature of 
its long-term economic impact. It will most certainly be 
bad, and almost certainly be worse than the financial and 
economic crisis of a decade ago, with many referring to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The International Monetary Fund’s current GDP forecast 
for annual growth in advanced economies in 2020 is 
a contraction of more than 6%.1 This might need to 
be revised downward at it does not fully capture the 
economic shock experienced everywhere. The economic 
repercussions of COVID-19 will be felt for quite some 
time; most certainly in 2021, which is looking to be a 
very difficult year, but most probably even beyond that.  
Uncertainty matters, not only at the 
individual and corporate levels but also for 
the design of policy interventions. 
The period of enforced economic inactivity in large 
parts of the EU economy not only impacts revenues, 
income and employment in the short term but also 
affects the long-term sustainability of many businesses. 
For example, many will accumulate debt during the 
lockdown. Clearly, government policy will mitigate some 
of this impact, especially in the short term. However, 
there will inevitably be limits that are also dependent on 
the length of this inactivity period. 
The uncertainty is even greater regarding the period 
following the gradual exit from the lockdown. The shape 
of the recovery to hopefully come is indefinite and very 
dependent on the nature of government intervention. 
Some countries will be able to cushion the negative 
trends much more effectively than others, which will 
increase divergence further. 
Uncertainty matters, not only at the individual and 
corporate levels but also for the design of policy 
interventions. What instruments will best amplify the 
expected bounce back at the end of the lockdown? How 
can we deal with the geographically different trajectories 
of this health crisis, which will impact on economic 
recovery, taking into account country-specific economic 
vulnerabilities? How do we best adapt to (widely 
anticipated) permanent shifts in demand between 
different activities and sectors? How will international 
and European supply chains be affected? How will the 
EU’s long-term policy trajectory towards the Green Deal 
be affected by the significant cash injections required 
to address the immediate crisis impacts now? Which 
orthodoxies will need to be jettisoned, and which ones 
promoted, to address the systemic nature of this crisis? 
The answers to these questions depend on a better 
understanding of what is happening and what will  
come next.
What kind of crisis and recovery?
There is much discussion and uncertainty on the 
shape the curve of the economic crisis will take, given 
the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 crisis. As 
illustrated below, some people have stipulated that we 
might face a V-shaped crisis, with a sharp decline in GDP 
but a rapid recovery. Others believe a U-shaped crisis is 
more likely, with a long-term decline (albeit less extreme) 
and only a gradual recovery. However, what many fear is 
an L-shape, where a decline is followed by a long-term 
depression without real recovery (see Figure 1).
The economic effects of the crisis are very uncertain and, 
in any case, unlikely to precisely follow the trajectories 
outlined above. There are possibilities of mixed 
trajectories: the shape of recovery altering over time, or 
a double dip (i.e. a W-shaped curve).
However, this crisis is likely to be fundamentally different 
from previous economic downturns. While predicting the 
economic impact precisely is impossible, the nature of 
this crisis will probably be unlike any economic crisis of 
the past. The enforced period of inactivity in countries hit 
by the pandemic, aimed at flattening the infection curve, 
led to an almost overnight precipitous fall in economic 
activity. An increasing number of companies are entering 
dangerous waters during the lockdown, not least because 
of the accumulation of liabilities without generating 
income. The longer that period of inactivity goes on, the 
more GDP will drop. 
This crisis is likely to be fundamentally 
different from previous economic downturns.
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back to work, a rebound is likely to occur. This will 
recover some of the lost GDP, but fail to recover it all. 
Furthermore, the conditions under which the lockdown 
will be lifted will heavily influence the nature and 
speed of recovery, not only in absolute terms but also 
with differences between countries, economic sectors 
and types of work. The shape of this crisis might well 
resemble a tilted pan, as illustrated in Figure 2.
What explains this possible trajectory? The shape of the 
pan – its depth and width, and the size of the rebound – 
will differ by country, depending on the evolution of the 
pandemic within national confines and the measures taken. 
This, in turn, will be dependent on both country-specific 
capabilities and economic vulnerabilities (e.g. dependence 
on tourism). When studying annual data, the post-lockdown 
rebound will not necessarily be visible as there will 
only be an aggregate, cumulative effect. In addition, the 
effect is likely to be mixed up with subsequent economic 
developments, with the rebound potentially creating the 
false impression of a return to growth. 
Caution will need to be taken to analyse the economic 
effects in greater depth, both over time and in 
disaggregated localities. The danger is that the situation 
is misjudged and that specific needs of particular places 
are overlooked within a too-broad aggregate picture.
Dangers of easing restrictions prematurely
There is a real danger that the end of restrictions will 
come too soon. If this leads to a second wave of COVID-
19 after reactivating economic activity and another 
phase of lockdown – partial or full –, the negative 
economic effect is likely to be reinforced. The pan shape 
will be replicated, albeit at an even lower GDP level 
than after the initial period of lockdown, resulting in a 
downwards ratchet effect and an even weaker rebound. 
Figure 3 illustrates the dangers of lifting restrictive 
measures too soon.
Again, there are further, possible variations. For 
example, only a partial lockdown could be necessary, 
or the second wave could be territorially patchy. 
Restrictions could be eased over time, in different 
phases. A second lockdown slump could affect only 
certain territories within a country if there are different 
local restrictions. And, in the worst-case scenario, this 
whole process could stretch over a protracted length 
of time, with multiple slumps and the possibility of no 
rebound due to ongoing uncertainty and restrictions.
 Fig. 1  Fig. 2 
TRADITIONAL CRISIS + RECOVERY SCENARIOS 
GDP
V-shaped U-shaped
L-shaped
Time
COVID-19: THE PAN 
Time
GDP
lockdown
rebound
6From the frying pan into the fire
Only after restrictions are relaxed and the consequent 
rebound has occurred will the full impact of the crisis 
be felt. In the best of all worlds, the recovery would 
commence post-rebound, slowly regaining the GDP 
lost during the acute crisis. More likely, however, is a 
long-term economic crisis that adds to the economic 
output lost during the lockdown. As explained above, 
such a crisis will have different shapes depending on the 
scenarios. If the lockdown creates too much damage, 
there might not even be a rebound. Different scenarios 
are illustrated in Figure 4. Only after this further 
economic downturn would a slow recovery begin, with 
the length of time to attain pre-crisis levels of GDP once 
again being uncertain.
The slump associated with the restrictions itself is thus 
not the only concern. Arguably, the initial economic 
downturn is almost a static effect followed by a partial 
rebound. While government policy can help by ensuring 
that businesses do not collapse during this period, 
government and/or EU stimulus action would have the 
greatest effect in influencing the shape of recovery 
during the post-restriction phase. 
This also implies that a double-dip recession is almost 
inevitable. The rebound effect is unlikely to last or be 
sustainable. Governments and economic actors should 
focus on the long haul, countering the long-term 
economic downturn and preventing it from becoming 
a protracted depression, in addition to mitigating the 
short-term impacts of the lockdown period. 
Government and/or EU stimulus action 
would have the greatest effect in 
influencing the shape of recovery during 
the post-restriction phase.
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After the lockdown phase – with all its potential ups 
and downs –, the strength of the rebound will depend 
on whether and to what extent economic activity can 
resume. This will critically depend on the demand for 
particular types of goods and services. While this is 
hard to predict precisely, it is unlikely that demand will 
return (quickly or at all) to pre-crisis levels in a number 
of sectors (e.g. aviation, tourism), creating excess supply. 
The consequence might be that certain economic 
activities in locations that promise to have low demand 
in future, and consequently low growth rates, will not 
resume. This could, for example, be an issue in places 
like the UK where the long-term trajectory suggests 
lower growth rates due to Brexit, or locations dependent 
on sectors (e.g. tourism) that will remain subdued. 
Nevertheless, governments are likely to continue 
supporting such sectors, given that they will have already 
been supported throughout the lockdown period. 
After the lockdown phase, the strength of 
the rebound will depend on whether and to 
what extent economic activity can resume. 
This can create inefficiencies in public policy if the 
aim of an intervention is to maintain ongoing activity 
throughout the lockdown. For example, Kurzarbeit 
programmes effectively retain employees in times of 
low demand, ready to be ‘reactivated’ once the worst 
of the crisis has passed. This worked well for countries 
like Germany that returned to ‘normal’ after the 2008 
financial and economic crisis, but it might not work as 
well in the current crisis if the world does not return to 
pre-COVID-19 crisis patterns. Effectiveness might also 
differ between countries, for example, if the economic 
crisis is deeper and/or takes longer.  
The world is not going to simply return to 
the behaviours preceding the crisis. 
In addition, there are likely to be significant structural 
shifts. The world is not going to simply return to the 
behaviours preceding the crisis – at least, not on the 
same scale. For the foreseeable future, there will likely 
be less demand for air travel, while high demand for 
online shopping will continue. Certain sectors (e.g. 
health, education) will be prioritised for investment to 
build capacity for the future, with a greater focus on 
non-tradeable sectors. Overall, the focus of economies 
is likely to shift and become more inward-looking, with 
governments taking a greater role in terms of ownership, 
stimulus and support. A necessary European industrial 
strategy will have new demands placed on it, not only 
adapting the existing set of rules but also coordinating 
national interventions.  
A differentiated impact
The economic impact of the crisis will vary across 
countries and regions, depending on the pandemic’s 
trajectory, the timing of the lockdown and individual 
characteristics of national economies. There will be 
different impacts due to the dominant sectors of the 
local economy, and the ability of economic activity to 
continue during the lockdown. Non-essential services 
involving direct contact (e.g. tourism, hospitality) are 
particularly affected. 
Regions and/or countries that reopen first are likely to 
have an advantage, regaining and, at times, overtaking 
others in the market. However, a second wave in these 
respective regions and/or countries is likely to have a 
devastating effect, for example, in terms of economic 
activity returning to sectors like hospitality or tourism. 
Hence it is in national governments’ interests to 
be extremely cautious when lifting some of their 
confinement measures.  
Regions and/or countries that reopen first 
are likely to have an advantage, regaining 
and, at times, overtaking others in the 
market.
However, path dependency and endowments matter, too. 
Much of the impact will depend on the starting position 
of the country or region in question. The weakest  
among and within countries will (once again) pay a 
higher price, while the strongest will also suffer but to 
a much lesser extent. Already vulnerable places and 
8groups of people are likely to be challenged further, even 
as others start to benefit from a rebooted economy, post-
lockdown. The overall resilience of the economy – for 
example, in terms of the financial sector’s strength or 
the fiscal sustainability of public finances – will play an 
important role. 
Government action matters…
The exact trajectory of each country will critically 
depend on government action at the national and sub-
national levels, in response to the health crisis and its 
economic repercussions. The EU’s collective actions 
will be decisive, too. Effectively flattening the curve 
and gaining control over the pandemic are priorities, 
but the tricky question is deciding what restrictions 
to lift, and when. The earlier they can be lifted, the 
better – but only if the health crisis is under control, 
which implies, among other issues, a greater capacity 
to test, maintaining social distancing and hygiene, an 
abundance of masks, and the competence to track and 
localise outbreaks. As noted above, in the case of a 
second COVID-19 outbreak due to a premature lifting 
of restrictions, the economic costs associated with 
a repeated pan-shaped slump, in addition to health 
implications, are likely to be even higher. This implies 
that a precautionary approach is best, including from an 
economic perspective. 
Governments must address their publics’ 
fears and worries in times of high 
uncertainty and unpredictability.
During the lockdown, the main aim of governments 
has been to maintain employment and keep businesses 
viable by providing bridge financing, or easier conditions 
in terms of taxes or social security payments. The overall 
aim is to prevent irretrievable damage – economic 
capacity could be permanently lost if this period is not 
bridged. For certain sectors and the self-employed, 
where demand has collapsed completely, these measures 
will also involve providing additional income, financed 
through additional government borrowing. However, 
while this is necessary, it will be insufficient to kickstart 
the economy once lockdowns are lifted, and will leave 
many companies and individuals with large liabilities 
that are unmatched by their assets or income. 
It is at the very end of the lockdown period, when 
economies rebound (to some extent), that there will 
be a need to provide additional public sector stimulus, 
including national and EU funds that are predominantly 
financed by borrowing. Member states and the EU will 
need to create additional demand through spending and 
public investment, providing substantive levels of state 
aid and, in many cases, taking on assets and, even more, 
liabilities from the private sector in areas like banking 
and finance, where the crisis could reignite difficulties 
around bad loans. This not only implies that sufficient 
funding must still be made available at this point, but 
also that the type of intervention might well be different 
from the remedies applied during the lockdown period. 
It also implies that public sectors must increase their 
capacity to manage these new economic realities (e.g. 
skills, management and procurement systems) while 
being constrained by fiscal pressures. 
Governments must also address their publics’ 
fears and worries in times of high uncertainty and 
unpredictability. If governments do not demonstrate 
that they can support the necessary turning point, 
the worst-case scenarios might actually become self-
fulfilling prophecies. The right messaging, backed by 
the necessary actions, will be crucial, but can also lose 
credibility if citizens do not see a consistent message 
across borders. 
This is a core reason why coordination across borders 
– especially in the EU – will be crucial, both in terms 
of dealing with the spillovers and the differing exit 
trajectories and economic response. Economic 
coordination is necessary to not only achieve the 
required scale of intervention but also deal with 
repercussions on competitive advantage or disadvantage 
resulting from interventions (e.g. state aid), which 
affects the level playing field within the Single Market. 
The EU should focus on coordinating 
learning and feedback. 
There will need to be a coordinated reduction of 
economic activity in sectors with excess capacity (e.g. 
aviation), which will impact the level of job losses 
across locations. Given the numerous spillover effects, 
a lack of coordination implies reduced effectiveness 
of measures within a single EU country and even the 
negation of actions taken elsewhere. In addition, the 
EU should focus on coordinating learning and feedback: 
determining what works and what does not, and learning 
from countries which emerge from the restrictive 
measures first, thus helping countries to benefit from 
each other’s experiences. 
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While public authorities will need to be more involved 
and interventionist than in the pre-crisis phase, they 
will also be fiscally weaker. Governments will run large 
deficits due to increased spending and reduced tax takes. 
One of the key questions will be the sustainability of 
public debt, accumulated at an alarming rate during 
the crisis, which will add to the already challenging 
fiscal constraints in many countries. The fiscal space 
for most (if not all) countries will be limited. Support 
mechanisms, like the actions of the European Central 
Bank, are necessary and will reduce the interest burden 
in the short term. However, Europe might well re-enter 
a renewed sovereign debt crisis, especially if no effective 
form of mutualisation of (some) new debt is found.  
There will be increased pressure to spend 
more on social security and public services.
Alongside greater debt and less fiscal space is 
governments’ heightened need to support parts of the 
economy. There will be increased pressure to spend 
more on social security and public services (e.g. health, 
education), which will only increase in the post-crisis 
environment. This implies making difficult choices 
regarding, for example, retirement age and pensions. 
The need to support particular sectors will be ongoing, 
carrying the risk that companies that are no longer 
viable (in the longer term) continue to be supported. 
Much of that support will be focused in areas most hit 
by the crisis (e.g. transport, tourism). Keeping existing 
businesses afloat might make it more difficult to achieve 
longer-term goals of greater sustainability, increased 
innovation and digitalisation.
In addition, populism, illiberalism and polarisation are 
likely to persist or re-emerge, challenging democratic 
principles in Europe and beyond. While governments 
are enjoying largescale public support at the height 
of the crisis, the challenging longer-term economic 
environment might very well result in declining support. 
Populists already offer seemingly easy solutions and 
scapegoats (relating to e.g. migration, free movement) 
in an increasingly complex world, and these might well 
have greater resonance when in an economic slump. 
This will be a particular challenge for the EU, with 
Eurosceptic tendencies potentially increasing across 
the board and Eurosceptic governments taking power in 
more member states. 
European and global interdependence
While COVID-19 is clearly a global crisis which 
highlights global interdependences, global cooperation 
is currently insufficient, and the G7 and G20 
mechanisms are not delivering. This is concerning: at 
the very least, a minimum level of coordination and 
cooperation would help avoid the worst. The last thing 
the world needs now is a fully-fledged trade war that 
increases economic costs and counters rebinding effects. 
Further economic disruption would not be absorbed in 
this economic environment, but rather aggravate the 
economic costs – this also points to an argument to 
prolong the Brexit transition period.2 
It is unlikely that globalisation will  
reverse. In fact, globalisation will have 
to be a key response and recipe to the 
inevitable economic crisis.
There is a further external dimension of the response  
to the pandemic’s challenges, both in terms of 
healthcare and economic development. The crisis will 
hit developing countries with minimal capacities to 
address these challenges. Given Europe’s commitment 
to global development objectives and moral 
responsibilities, as well as the repercussions that would 
be felt in the EU, there is a need to think proactively 
about how the EU can help these countries in need from 
the outset.
As a result of the crisis, global patterns will shift. 
It is unlikely that globalisation will reverse. In fact, 
globalisation will have to be a key response and recipe 
to the inevitable economic crisis. However, it will take a 
different shape, with many countries likely to emphasise 
some form of strategic autonomy, particularly in sectors 
that are seen as essential for the safety of citizens 
(including but not limited to healthcare). State aid for 
and state involvement in many sectors will become the 
norm across different economies, and more countries 
will attempt to shield strategic sectors from global  
buy-outs, creating a new dynamic in international trade 
and investment. 
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In many countries, the mindset of ‘my country first’ 
will strongly (re-)emerge in the aftermath of the 
health crisis. Suspicions and tensions will continue to 
characterise global interactions, and the most powerful 
countries will attempt to redefine their level of control 
over their relationships with the rest of the world. For 
smaller countries that are essentially rule-takers and 
dependent on the functioning of a global multilateral 
system increasingly under threat, this shifting of global 
relations will be challenging.  
To be able to maintain Europe’s current 
living standards in a more restrictive 
global environment, reliance on each other 
will become even more important.
In this context, the EU could potentially have a different 
role,3 not as a global superpower but a champion of 
constructive and international engagement. This will only 
be possible if EU member states manage to act coherently.
For relatively small, open economies like EU member 
states, it will be economically essential to remain open 
and interlinked with the global economy. Nevertheless, 
European and international supply chains will 
potentially be disrupted and, at times, permanently 
altered in the aftermath of the pandemic due to 
differential trajectories in different parts of Europe 
and the world. It will be more difficult to move people 
around freely, and some restrictions along borders are 
likely to be persistent over time.
This makes the Single Market even more important 
for the EU and its member states. They are all unable 
to shape the global environment individually but are 
reliant on cross-border trade and investment. To be able 
to maintain Europe’s current living standards in a more 
restrictive global environment, reliance on each other will 
become even more important. This will be challenging, 
as asymmetric national crisis recovery measures might 
well bring the Single Market under pressure, thereby 
increasing tensions between member states. By contrast, 
a functioning Single Market necessitates that member 
states work together more, including in areas where 
national emphasis still dominates (e.g. industrial policy). 
Given the level of integration and interdependence 
already achieved within the Single Market, the EU will 
not be able to achieve its long-term objectives – namely 
competitiveness combined with sustainability and 
strategic autonomy – without a common approach in 
industrial policy (on e.g. state aid, investment screening). 
A new normal?
It is highly unlikely that the world, and Europe more 
specifically, will return to the economic status quo ante. 
The depth and nature of the crisis imply that there will 
be many structural changes, and the world’s approach 
to economic development will alter. These changes can 
be positive or negative and might differ across countries 
and regions. It might be that in some countries, 
the crisis will generate an impetus towards a more 
sustainable and socially just society. However, many 
governments will be tempted to focus on jobs  
and growth solely, regardless of the social or 
environmental impact. 
The crisis is likely to accelerate 
digitalisation and could, if supported 
by governments, help foster greater 
sustainability, including in terms of 
climate action. This is by no means 
automatic, however.
There will also be divergence within the EU. The Union 
will have to manage such tensions while simultaneously 
encouraging the positive transformations that remain at 
the heart of EU policy. Climate change and sustainability 
will still need to be top of the agenda, given the 
existential threat that remains to life on earth. The 
digital transformation still offers many opportunities 
for future growth. The crisis is likely to accelerate 
digitalisation and could, if supported by governments, 
help foster greater sustainability, including in terms of 
climate action. This is by no means automatic,  
however; it will need to be a conscious and sustained 
policy choice.
The long-term effects of the crisis will also challenge 
economic orthodoxies. The delineation between the 
public and private sectors will become increasingly 
blurry. In many areas, there is a call to suspend 
competitive behaviour for now and work on solutions 
cooperatively (e.g. the development of a vaccine). Such 
changes are likely to have longer-term repercussions, 
with governments providing strong, strategic leadership 
in the future, influencing or directing many private 
sector decisions. Exceptions to competition rules, state 
aid, even when clearly distorting the level playing field, 
and state influence or even ownership will be much 
more commonplace. This is a particular challenge for  
the European Union, given the impact this will have 
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across borders, with different countries having very 
different capabilities.  
These changes will challenge the Union. 
The institutions and mechanisms that it 
has set up over the decades are based on 
very different premises.
Approaches to macroeconomic management, monetary 
policy and the financial sector are also likely to change. 
Many private sector liabilities will become public 
liabilities, with the involvement of governments in 
banking and the financial sector most likely becoming 
a permanent fixture. Support to companies will 
be conditioned on a number of factors, allowing 
governments to adopt a much stronger interventionist 
approach to market and industry behaviour (e.g. 
corporate governance, possible ‘greening’ policies and 
practices). Many governments will end up with much 
more private equity than before the crisis. Monetary 
policy will increasingly be used to tackle ‘real economy’ 
challenges proactively. It might well be that our 
relationship to inflation will change, with a recognition 
that deflation remains a distinct threat and that a debt 
crisis is easier to address with a certain level of inflation. 
And debt will (to a certain extent) be mutualised, 
reflecting the inevitable interdependence between 
Europe’s economies.
These changes will challenge the Union. The institutions 
and mechanisms that it has set up over the decades 
are based on very different premises. Namely, a central 
bank with a core focus on price stability, a Single 
Market that aims to eliminate governmental distortions 
across borders, economic governance that constrains 
governments and mutual debt, and a commercial policy 
that is based on maximum openness to the rest of the 
world. The achievements of this economic approach 
can and should be preserved but, at the same time, 
adaptations will be essential for a very different, post-
COVID-19 world. 
Implications for Europe
The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated dramatically that 
we all live in an interdependent world, where inevitable 
spillover effects cannot be prevented, be it in the health 
or economic sphere. These large shocks, originating 
from outside of Europe but affecting us down to the 
local level, can threaten our way of life, both directly 
and indirectly. Arguably, at the global level, the only 
effective instrument that has been created to deal with 
such cross-border challenges is the European Union. 
This should be the Union’s finest hour – but, crucially, it 
is dependent on whether it will deliver collectively. 
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There is much Europe can, and must, do. It requires 
fast and decisive action, with a much greater strategic 
orientation, anticipating developments rather than 
simply reacting to them. Europe needs a convincing 
economic package deal that draws on a range of 
different instruments to be armed with maximum 
firepower, as well as to put in place a coordinated 
exit strategy. Politicians must work together, creating 
mutually reinforcing and confidence-building 
narratives.4 Europe will need to come together, 
coordinating and cooperating, and ensure that there is 
overarching coherence.
Unconditional and effective solidarity that transcends 
borders will be needed in Europe to help those most 
affected: “the EU and its members stand and fall 
together. No country can isolate itself from the effects of 
the COVID-19 crisis and unconditional solidarity guided 
by the principle of enlightened self-interest will have 
to light the Union’s way out of the crisis.”5 This will be 
necessary in the short term, to deal with the economic 
slump associated with lockdown restrictions, as well 
as in the longer-term fiscal stimulus. Some countries 
are already unable to financially support measures like 
Kurzarbeit for long, thus requiring additional cross-
border support to maintain such mechanisms. The 
SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an 
Emergency) programme is only a starting point, given 
that it still relies on additional national debt, albeit 
at better conditions. Grants and transfers will also be 
necessary. They could be time-limited and target the 
immediate crisis response only.
Past rules and frameworks must not stand in the way 
of effective action. Funding needs to be targeted at the 
greatest current needs, in specific policies areas like 
healthcare and in specific territories, rather than be 
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driven by past eligibility and pre-crisis rules. Historical 
conditionalities for related funds must be minimised, 
ensuring instead that the money is targeted and  
spent when and where necessary (i.e. to support core 
public services). 
Old divisions should not be allowed to stand in the 
way of effective crisis response, for example, regarding 
an agreement on the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework. The nature of Europe is compromise; 
absolutist positions taken by any side in these public 
debates prevents an effective European response. 
Old divisions should not be allowed  
to stand in the way of effective  
crisis response.
There will not be a return to normal after the crisis. 
Economies will change, and countries will be challenged 
in varying degrees – although all European countries 
will be affected negatively. Only by sticking together, 
coordinating and cooperating, and relying on common 
instruments like the Single Market, can they hope to 
recover and transform their economies to render them 
future-proof. 
The key lesson is that at a time when many instincts 
point to a greater focus on the national level and  
greater sovereignty and self-reliance, the best answer 
lies in greater cooperation, at the very least at the 
European level. 
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2 See Zuleeg, Fabian (2020), “The need for a longer transition”, Brussels: 
European Policy Centre.
3 See Grevi, Giovanni (2020), “Winning the peace against coronavirus”, 
Brussels: European Policy Centre.
4 Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Fabian Zuleeg (2020), “COVID-19: Lessons from 
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